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I. UTAH COMMON LAW ALLOWS AN INSURER TO BRING A SUBROGATION 
ACTION IN ITS OWN NAME. WILSONS’ ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY ARE 
NOT CONVINCING. 
 
  In its opinion, after interpreting § 31A-21-108, the Utah Court of Appeals stated, 
“Our review of Utah case law convinces us that . . . no independent right exists for an 
insurer to seek subrogated damages in its own name.” Wilson v. Educators Mut. Ins. 
Ass’n., 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 8, 368 P.3d 471. The court of appeals went on to hold Utah 
law does not permit a subrogating insurer to file a subrogation action in its own name and 
thus, EMIA’s claim should be dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 12–13.  In its brief to the supreme court, 
EMIA presented several subrogation cases in which an insurer did sue in its own name to 
demonstrate that the court of appeals’ interpretation of § 31A-21-108 was incorrect and 
that insurance companies do have a common law right to sue in their own names when 
subrogating. Br. of Appellant (“EMIA’s Br.”) at 9–23. Wilsons argue the court of appeals 
correctly interpreted § 31A-21-108, and then attempt to distinguish the cases presented 
by EMIA by claiming the cases are exceptions to the general rule that a subrogating 
insurer cannot sue in its own name.  Br. of Appellee (“Wilsons’ Br.”) at 7–16. 
While Wilsons’ position is untenable, even if  the Wilsons are correct, their 
position would support reversing the decision of the court of appeals. Wilsons 
acknowledge that Utah law allows an insurer to bring a subrogation action in its own 
name in several instances, contrary to the court of appeals’ decision, but then claim these 
instances are no more than exceptions. Id. Specifically, Wilsons argue Utah law has 
established special rules allowing an insurer to bring a subrogation action in its own name 
in the following four areas: (1) property damage cases; (2) when the insured has been 
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made whole; (3) worker’s compensation cases; and (4) when an insurer sues another 
insurer. Id. Wilsons argue Utah law specifically limits an insurer’s right to bring 
subrogation actions to cases where at least one of the above four categories are present. 
This is not the case nor was it the rule articulated by the court of appeals.  In reality, 
rather than exceptions, the cases cited clearly illustrate and support the general 
proposition that an insurer can bring a subrogation action in its own name and that the 
court of appeals’ interpretation of § 31A-21-108 was incorrect.  Each of the four 
categories proposed by the Wilsons will be discussed in turn.   
A. UTAH COMMON LAW ALLOWS AN INSURER TO BRING A SUBROGATION 
ACTION IN ITS OWN NAME TO RECOUP MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
 
 Wilsons acknowledge Utah common law allows an insurer to bring a subrogation 
action in its own name for property damage claims, but then argue that under Utah 
common law, EMIA cannot subrogate to recoup medical expenses because those 
expenses are associated with personal injury damages.  Wilsons’ Br. at 8–9. Wilsons’ 
proposition is incorrect. 
 Wilsons wrongly cite to Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98 (Utah 
1944). Wilsons’ Br. at 8–9. As EMIA discussed in its Brief of Appellant, this particular 
portion of Johanson cited by Wilsons was a review of other jurisdiction’s laws that the 
Johanson Court expressly rejected. EMIA’s Br. at 17–20. Furthermore, the Utah 
Supreme Court has since specifically acknowledged an insurer’s right, under common 
law, to bring a subrogation action for medical expenses in State Farm Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 450 P.2d 458 (Utah 1969) (“State Farm I”).  
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 In State Farm I a similar argument as the Wilsons’ was raised.  See State Farm 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 493 P.2d 1002, 1002–03 (1972) (“State Farm II”) 
(setting forth factual background and arguments raised in State Farm I). Specifically, the 
tortfeasor’s insurer in State Farm I argued subrogation is a form of assignment and, under 
common law, assignment of personal injury claims was not allowed, so therefore the 
insurer could not bring its subrogation action. See State Farm I, 450 P.2d at 459. The 
Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding an insurer has the right to bring 
subrogation claims against a tortfeasor with respect to medical expenses according to the 
insurer’s insurance policy with its insured. Id. It is also important to note the subrogating 
insurer in State Farm I sued in its own name.  
Similarly, in the present matter EMIA is seeking subrogation regarding the 
medical expenses it paid in behalf of its insured.  In accordance with State Farm I EMIA 
has the right to file its action against the tortfeasor and do so in its own name. The 
common law right to do so has been part of Utah law since at least 1969.   
B. THE MADE WHOLE DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY. 
 
 Wilsons next claim a special rule that an insurer may not seek subrogation in its 
own name unless the insurer has fully indemnified the insured for all damages for which 
the wrongdoer could be held liable. Wilson’s Br. at 9–11. Wilsons have touched upon an 
important rule, the made whole doctrine, but have altered the rule substantially by 
claiming the rule dictates in whose name a subrogation claim must be brought. The made 
whole doctrine does not dictate when an insurer can bring a subrogation action in its own 
name. Rather, the made whole doctrine applies in equitable subrogation cases 
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(subrogation matters where the insurance policy does not set forth contractual terms 
regarding subrogation) and creates rules for insurers seeking subrogation rights 
irrespective of whose name the case is brought in.  
Wilsons incorrectly argue that the Utah Supreme Court has held an insurer must 
fully indemnify an insured before it can sue in its own name. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 1996); Cook v. Cook, 174 P.2d 
434 (Utah 1946); Featherstone v. Emerson, 45 Pac. 713 (Utah 1896); Davis Cnty. v. 
Jensen, 2003 UT App 444, 83 P.3d 405). None of these cases address the issue of 
whether or not an insurer can sue in its own name, rather, the cited cases are articulations 
of the made whole doctrine and when it is applicable.1 Specifically, these cases cited by 
Wilsons only articulate the rule that a party seeking equitable subrogation must fully 
indemnify the injured party before seeking subrogation rights.  Again, the principle of 
equitable subrogation is void when the insurance policy dictates terms regarding 
subrogation.  Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864, 866 (Utah 1988) 
disapproved of on separate grounds by Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 
P.2d 127 (Utah 1997). 
                                                           
1
 In its opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals cites to Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co. for 
the proposition that an insurer may be able to seek subrogation damages in its own name 
if it has fully indemnified the insured. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 8, 368 P.3d 471. As 
EMIA discussed in Brief of Appellant, this particular portion of Johanson cited by the 
court of appeals was a review of other jurisdictions’ laws that was rejected by the 
Johanson Court. Wilsons counter that the court of appeals was not relying on Johanson 
for its holding, Wilsons’ Br. at 11–12, but rather cited Johanson for a good review of the 
general law. Id. at 11. Regardless, the view was rejected by the Johanson Court and was 
not addressed in the cases cited by Wilsons. Wilsons’ rule that in insurer can seek 
subrogation rights only after fully indemnifying its insured is not Utah law. 
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The made whole doctrine is inapplicable in the present case. The Utah Supreme 
Court has given clear instruction as to when principles of equitable subrogation and 
contractual subrogation apply. In 1988, the Utah Supreme Court distinguished between 
equitable and contractual subrogation in Hill v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 
765 P. 2d 864. The Utah Supreme Court stated, “[s]ubrogation is an equitable doctrine 
and is governed by equitable principles. This doctrine can be modified by contract, but in 
the absence of express terms to the contrary, the insured must be made whole before the 
insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from a recovery from the third-party tort-feasor.” Id. 
at 866 (emphasis added). See also Birch v. Fire Ins. Exch., 2005 UT App 395, ¶ 7, 122 
P.3d 696 (“The subrogation doctrine can be modified by contract.”) In this matter, where 
there is a contract with express terms to the contrary, equitable subrogation and the made 
whole doctrine are inapplicable. See R. at 624–25 (setting forth contractual subrogation 
terms). See generally R. at 605–85 (setting forth full insurance contract). 
 While it is clear the present case is based in contractual subrogation, and hence the 
made whole doctrine does not apply, Wilsons do not attempt to apply the actual rule 
articulated in the cases they cited. Rather, Wilsons seek to alter the made whole doctrine 
to create a nonexistent rule restricting in whose name a subrogation action may be 
brought.  
C. UTAH COMMON LAW ALLOWS AN INSURER TO BRING A SUBROGATION 
ACTION IN ITS OWN NAME, INCLUDING IN WORKERS COMPENSATION CASES.  
 
 Wilsons argue that a workers compensation insurer is entitled to bring an action in 
its own name only because Utah Code allows them to do so. Wilsons’ Br. at 11–14. 
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While modern day statute does specifically allow this right, early workers compensation 
statutes did not. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court relied on general common law 
subrogation principles to determine that insurers in workers compensation cases could 
bring a subrogation action in their own name. See Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104 (“when . . . 
no special rules for maintaining the [subrogation] action are prescribed, the proceeding to 
enforce the rights gained by subrogation will be controlled by general principles of 
subrogation as affected by statutes governing pleading.”).  
 Wilsons’ analysis of Johanson, an early workers compensation case, is incorrect. 
Wilsons incorrectly claim that 42-1-58, R.S.U. 1933 (“42-1-58”), the statute giving a 
workers compensation insurer a statutory right to subrogate at the time of the Johanson 
case, was similar in substance to modern day workers compensation statutes in that it 
expressly authorized a workers compensation insurer to bring a subrogation action in its 
own name. Wilsons’ Br. at 12. However, Wilsons are incorrect.  
 42-1-58, R.S.U. 1933 reads in full as follows: 
When any injury for which compensation is payable under this title shall 
have been caused by the wrongful act of a third person, the injured 
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may at their option claim 
compensation under this title or have their action for damages against such 
third person; and, if compensation is claimed and awarded, the employer or 
insurance carrier having paid the compensation shall be subrogated to the 
rights of such employee or his dependents to recover against such third 
person; provided, if such recovery shall be in excess of the amount of the 
compensation awarded and paid, then such excess, less the reasonable 
expenses of the action, shall be paid to the employee or his dependents. 
 
42-1-58, R.S.U. 1933. See also Addend. A (supplying a copy of statute as it appeared in 
the Revised Statutes of Utah (1933)). The statutory right afforded by 42-1-58 was the 
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right to subrogate. Unlike modern day workers compensation statutes, and contrary to 
Wilsons’ assertions, 42-1-58 did not state in whose name the subrogation rights could be 
pursued. 
 The Johanson Court recognized 42-1-58 did not prescribe the manner in which 
such a subrogation action should be maintained. The Court noted, “when this right of 
subrogation was given by statute as it is in Section 42-1-58 and no special rules for 
maintaining the action are prescribed, the proceeding to enforce the rights gained by 
subrogation will be controlled by general principles of subrogation as affected by statutes 
governing pleading.” Id. at 104 (emphasis added). The Johanson Court held that under 
Utah’s subrogation common law and Utah’s real party in interest statute, both the insured 
and the insurer are real parties in interest, co-owner’s of the insured’s cause of action, and 
both may maintain the action in their own name. Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104–05. 
 Those same general, common law subrogation principles apply today like they did 
back in 1944. While early workers compensation insurers had a statutory right to 
subrogate, their right to do so in their own name was granted by common law general 
principles of subrogation.  
D. UTAH COMMON LAW ALLOWS AN INSURER TO BRING A SUBROGATION 
ACTION IN ITS OWN NAME AGAINST BOTH A TORTFEASOR AND THE TORTFEASOR’S 
INSURER. 
 
 Finally, Wilsons claim that Utah common law “carved out a special standing rule 
allowing insurers to sue other insurers” in their own name. Wilsons’ Br. at 15 (claiming 
the special rule was carved out by the Utah Supreme Court). There is no such special 
standing rule. The cases cited by Wilsons do mark the articulation of an important 
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subrogation development in Utah law, but the development has nothing to do with in 
whose name the subrogation action can be pursued. Rather, the development allowed 
subrogating insurers to directly sue both the tortfeasor and/or the tortfeasor’s insurer.  
 Wilsons cite to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Northwestern 
National Insurance Co. The full quote reads as follows: 
Utah law clearly recognizes an insurer’s right to bring a subrogation action 
on behalf of its insured against a tortfeasor. More significantly, we have 
extended this principle to an action by an insurer against a second insurance 
company which is primarily liable to defend or pay any claims on behalf of 
its insured but which has denied coverage. 
 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 1996) (internal 
citations omitted). The rule articulated in State Farm Mutual is that the subrogation rights 
an insurer has against a tortfeasor can also be claimed against the tortfeasor’s insurer. The 
rule does not grant an additional right for an insurer to sue another insurer in its own 
name. An insurer could sue another insurer in its own name because an insurer already 
had that right against the tortfeasor and that right was extended to the tortfeasor’s insurer. 
The special standing rule, as articulated by Wilsons, simply does not exist. 
II. PROCEDURAL AND POLICY CONCERNS IN SUBROGATION ACTIONS. 
The court of appeals stated EMIA had alternative routes available to protect 
EMIA’s rights including pursuing its rights through probate and intervening in Wilsons’ 
cause of action. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 12, 368 P.3d 471. Wilsons, however, 
presented conflicting arguments. Wilsons first agreed with the Utah Court of Appeals that 
EMIA had alternatives in either a probate proceeding or by intervening in the Wilsons’ 
cause of action. Wilsons’ Br. at 21–23. But Wilsons then argued that an insurer loses its 
9 
 
subrogation rights if an insured passes away, rearguing their arguments made below at 
the court of appeals. Wilsons’ Br. at 21–23; see also Br. of Appellant at 17–18, Wilson, 
2016 UT App 38, 368 P.3d 471 (arguing Utah’s survival statute prevents EMIA from 
“stand[ing] in the shoes of a dead person.”). As The Utah Court of Appeals never reached 
Wilson’s argument that an insurer’s rights are extinguished upon the death of their 
insured, and that issue is not now before the Utah Supreme Court, EMIA will not address 
that issue here. The issues of a probate proceeding and intervention are each addressed 
below. EMIA will then briefly address Wilsons’ assertions as to the legislative intent 
behind Utah’s subrogation statute. 
First, the proposition that an insurer can pursue its rights through probate is 
problematic.  It is unclear if EMIA could have been a personal representative of Ms. 
Wilson’s estate.  See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-203(1) (setting forth categories of persons 
who can be personal representatives and priority of appointment; an insurer may not fit in 
any of the prescribed categories unless it is a creditor).  But, even if EMIA could be 
viewed as a creditor, it would have had the lowest priority of appointment.  Id.  Most 
likely, EMIA would be at the mercy of an individual with standing, or a higher priority of 
appointment, to commence the administration of Ms. Wilson’s estate. As noted in 
EMIA’s initial brief, see EMIA’s Br. at 24–25, this present case illustrates that the 
interests of the family of the decedent and that of the insurer are often conflicted. A 
personal representative or family member would have little incentive to assist an insurer 
if doing so would potentially reduce the amount of assets or funds available for the 
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family member to receive. Id. The probate option is really not available as a practical 
matter.  
Next, the intervention alternative is equally problematic. First, if an insurer cannot 
instigate a subrogation action in cases such as this, but must wait to intervene in an heir’s 
action, the insurer is at the mercy of the heirs to bring a cause of action before it may 
protect its subrogation rights. This is at odds with the holding in Johanson that, as joint 
real parties in interest and co-owners of the insured’s cause of action, both the insured 
and insurer may bring the cause of action, and neither is precluded from pursuing the 
cause of action just because the other party declined to do so. Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104–
05. Second, the very same arguments Wilsons made that EMIA does not have standing to 
bring a subrogation case could likewise be raised if EMIA had sought to intervene.  As a 
practical matter, intervention does not insure an insurer’s subrogation rights are protected 
because it may not be available.  
There are questions about whether the intervention or probate routes articulated by 
the Utah Court of Appeals could really have protected EMIA’s rights. Under either route, 
EMIA could not enforce its subrogation rights without the cooperation of Wilsons. As 
this case has shown, the Wilsons have been adverse to EMIA exercising its rights. 
Dependence on the Wilsons is not necessary however, as Utah law already allows an 
insurer to protect its subrogation rights in the manner followed by EMIA.  
Finally, EMIA contests the policy articulation made by Wilsons. Without citation, 
Wilson claim the “strong policy [of] § 31A-21-108 is to prevent the splitting of a cause of 
action.” Wilsons’ Br. at 19. Wilsons’ provide no basis for this legislative intent assertion.  
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Like Amicus, see Br. of Amicus at 7–9, EMIA searched the legislative history behind 
enactment of § 31A-21-108, Utah’s subrogation statute, but could not find a specific 
articulation of the legislature’s intent in passing the statute. However, the intent of 
passing such statutes on a national, state-by-state basis is well documented. The purpose 
behind such statutes granting an insurer the right to bring a subrogation action in the 
name of its insured is to prevent a jury from discovering that the insured’s loss may have 
been covered by insurance. See Daniel W. Coffey, A Rose by Another Name? Use of the 
Insured’s Name in Subrogation Actions, NASP SUBROGATOR, Spring/Summer (2004), 
http://www.subrogation.org/download/article/A-Rose-By-Another-Name_Use-of-the-
Insureds-Name-in-Subrogation-Actions.pdf. EMIA recognizes that this national rationale 
for the state-by-state push for such legislation is persuasive at best as to the Utah 
legislature’s intent in passing § 31A-21-108. For this reason, EMIA has, to this point, 
refrained from making such inferences. However, with Wilsons articulating a legislative 
intent without citing any basis, it is important this Court know the policy reason behind a 
national push for such legislation. 
III. RULE 17 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE APPLIES. 
As EMIA has argued previously, Rule 17 is applicable to this matter and 
prevented the court of appeals from ordering EMIA’s matter be dismissed.  Rule 17 states 
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed 
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder 
or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or 
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced 
in the name of the real party in interest. 
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U.R.C.P. 17(a). (emphasis added).  Despite the clear language in Rule 17, in its opinion, 
the Utah Court of Appeals stated, “We conclude that EMIA lacked standing to pursue a 
subrogation action against Krueger in its own name. Thus, the trial court erred in dividing 
the Wilsons’ settlement with EMIA. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and 
remand with instructions for the trial court to dismiss EMIA’s claims. . . .” Wilson, 2016 
UT App 38, ¶ 13, 368 P.3d 471. (emphasis added).  EMIA’s ability to bring a subrogation 
action in its own name is not a standing issue, rather a real party in interest issue 
governed by Rule 17, making dismissal inappropriate. While EMIA believes it was 
proper to bring its subrogation action in its own name, even if it could not under the court 
of appeals’ reasoning, EMIA would have had standing had it brought its subrogation 
action in the name of its insured. See Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 12, 368 P.3d 471 
(“EMIA should have brought its personal injury action in the name of the estate or 
intervened in the Wilsons’ action against Krueger.”).  The court of appeals should not 
have dismissed EMIA’s claims, even if the wrong party was named.  
Despite the above, Wilsons argue Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
inapplicable to this matter for three reasons: first, EMIA’s case against the tortfeasor was 
dismissed; second, the right to have the real party in interest substituted belonged to the 
tortfeasor; and third, EMIA had a reasonable time to substitute the real party in interest.  
See Wilsons’ Br. at 24–25.  None of these positions are persuasive and each will be dealt 
with in turn below.  





 Wilsons first challenge the applicability of Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure on the basis that EMIA’s action against the tortfeasor was dismissed.  See 
Wilsons’ Br. at 24.  Wilsons are correct that after the claims filed by EMIA and the 
Wilsons were consolidated, the parties stipulated to release and dismiss the tortfeasor 
from the lawsuit upon the tortfeasor interpleading $100,000—the tortfeasor insurance 
liability policy limit—with the trial court. R. at 543, 841.  However, Wilsons’ arguments 
as to the import of the above are confusing at best.  Initially, it should be noted Wilsons 
cite to no authority for their proposition.  Wilsons then go on to assert, “EMIA has 
standing in this interpleader case to litigate its right to the interpleader funds, but the 
Court of Appeals directed the trial court to dismiss EMIA from the interpleader action 
because it lacked standing in the case it filed against Krueger.” Wilsons’ Br. at 24.  
Wilsons offer no explanation for the interesting proposition that it would have been 
appropriate for EMIA to sue in its own name in conjunction with the interpleader portion 
of the case, but not in the action dealing directly with the liability of the tortfeasor.  Nor 
was this particular distinction made by the court of appeals in its opinion.   
B. THE FACT THAT THE TORTFEASOR HAD THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE 
SUBSTITUTION OF THE ALLEGED REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AND FAILED TO DO SO 
DOES NOT ADVANCE WILSONS' POSITION. 
 
 Next, Wilsons argue Rule 17 is inapplicable because “the right to have the real 
party in interest substituted into an action” belonged to the tortfeasor.  Wilsons’ Br. at 24 
(citing Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft and Co., 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980)).  However, this fact 
does little to improve Wilsons’ position.  In Johanson, the Utah Supreme Court stated, 
“The failure on the part of the plaintiffs to make the [missing party] a party plaintiff, or if 
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it refused to join, make it a party defendant, is at the most a defect in parties plaintiff. 
Such a defect is waived unless raised.” 152 P.2d at 104–05. Clearly, failure to join the 
missing party is a defect that, unless raised, is waived. Id. at 104–05.  Under Johanson, if 
the tortfeasor has been dismissed, it would appear that the issue of whether or not EMIA 
could have brought the suit in its own name or not is waived and should not have served 
as a basis for dismissing EMIA’s claims.   
C. EMIA DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE TIME TO SUBSTITUTE THE REAL PARTY 
IN INTEREST. 
 
  Finally, Wilsons argue EMIA had more than enough time to substitute the real 
party in interest.  See Wilsons’ Brief at pg. 24–25.  While EMIA believes it is the real 
party in interest and was at all times, even if it were not, Wilsons’ proposition is 
problematic.  First, early on in the case, the tortfeasor attempted to dismiss EMIA’s 
action for lack of standing. R. at 783–90.  After oral argument, the trial court denied that 
motion and ruled EMIA did indeed have standing to bring its subrogation action and 
could properly do so in its own name. R. at 820–22.  While EMIA believes and maintains 
that the determination of the trial court regarding EMIA’s ability to bring an action in its 
own name was correct, even if the trial court ruled incorrectly, Wilsons fault EMIA for 
not unilaterally overruling the order of the trial court. To require a party to take such an 
action is inappropriate and nonsensical.  Further, Wilsons do not cite to any legal 
authority for their assertion that such an action is required or appropriate.    
Second, no party objected to EMIA being the real party in interest. Rule 17 states, 
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed 
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after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or 
joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, 
joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been 
commenced in the name of the real party in interest. 
  U.R.C.P. 17(a) (emphasis added).  While a motion to dismiss was filed challenging 
EMIA’s standing to bring the action, no objection or motion was ever made pursuant to 
Rule 17 arguing that EMIA was not the real party in interest.  
CONCLUSION 




DATED this 9th day of December, 2016. 
 
       /s/ Jeffrey A. Callister_________ 
         Randall R. Smart 
         Jeffrey A. Callister 
 Chad P. Curtis 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of December, 2016, I caused to be served the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT/PETITIONER upon the parties of record in this 
proceeding set forth below by the method indicated:   
 
Jack C. Helgesen (1451) 
Craig Helgesen (12547) 
HELGESEN, HOUTZ & JONES, P.C. 
1531 Hill Field Road #3 
Layton UT  84015 
 
Attorneys for Appellees/Respondents 
 
__  Electronic Filing 
__  Email 
__  Facsimile 
_X_  U.S. Mail, 1st Class, Postage Prepaid 
__  Hand Delivery 
 
 
      /s/ Chad P. Curtis_____________  
 
 


